We Intercepted the White House App's Network Traffic. Here's What It Sends.

This is a follow-up to our static analysis of the White House iOS app. In that post, we decompiled the app and documented what the code could do. Critics fairly pointed out that compiled code doesn’t mean active code.

So we set up a MITM proxy and watched what the app actually sends.

Setup

We installed mitmproxy on a Mac, configured an iPhone to route traffic through it, and installed the mitmproxy CA certificate on the device. Then we opened the White House app (v47.0.4, build 81) and browsed every tab: Home, News, Live, Social, and Explore.

All HTTPS traffic was decrypted and logged. No modifications were made to the traffic. The app was used as any normal user would use it.

What the App Contacts

On a single browsing session across all tabs, the app made requests to 34 unique hosts:

Of the 212 total requests captured, only 48 (22%) went to whitehouse.gov. The other 164 (78%) went to third-party services including Elfsight, OneSignal, YouTube, Google DoubleClick, Facebook, and Twitter.

What OneSignal Receives

This is no longer speculation from symbol analysis. This is the actual decrypted HTTPS request body sent to api.onesignal.com on app launch:

{
    "properties": {
        "language": "en",
        "timezone_id": "America/[REDACTED]",
        "country": "US",
        "first_active": 1774908688,
        "last_active": 1774909124,
        "ip": "[REDACTED]"
    },
    "identity": {
        "onesignal_id": "[REDACTED]"
    },
    "subscriptions": [
        {
            "id": "[REDACTED]",
            "session_time": 61,
            "session_count": 3,
            "sdk": "050500",
            "device_model": "iPhone[REDACTED]",
            "device_os": "[REDACTED]",
            "rooted": false,
            "app_version": "47.0.4",
            "net_type": 1,
            "carrier": ""
        }
    ]
}

On a single app launch, OneSignal receives:

• Your language and timezone (narrows you to a region)
• Your country
• Your IP address (full IPv6)
• When you first opened the app and when you were last active (exact timestamps)
• Your device model and OS version (device fingerprint)
• Whether you’re on WiFi or cellular
• Your carrier
• Whether your device is jailbroken
• How many times you’ve opened the app
• How long you spent in each session (in seconds)
• A persistent unique identifier that tracks you across sessions

The app sent multiple PATCH requests to OneSignal on each launch, updating your profile with session counts, session time, and device metadata. In our first capture (launch only), we observed 18 PATCH requests. In our full browsing session, we observed 9 total OneSignal requests including GETs and PATCHes.

The User-Agent header identifies the traffic: WhiteHouse/81 CFNetwork/3860.400.51 Darwin/25.3.0

13 Elfsight Domains

Our static analysis found six Elfsight widgets and a two-stage JavaScript loader. The dynamic analysis confirms it. When you open the Social tab, the app contacts multiple Elfsight-controlled domains. Between our static analysis of platform.js and the live traffic capture, we observed the following:

1. elfsightcdn.com (platform.js CDN)
2. core.service.elfsight.com (boot API, returns scripts to inject)
3. static.elfsight.com (static assets)
4. storage.elfsight.com (file storage)
5. phosphor.utils.elfsightcdn.com (utility scripts)
6. universe-static.elfsightcdn.com (static CDN)
7. widget-data.service.elfsight.com (widget data service)
8. video-proxy.wu.elfsightcompute.com (video proxy)
9. cors-proxy.utils.elfsightcdn.com (CORS proxy)
10. apps.elfsight.com (apps service)
11. dash.elfsight.com (dashboard)
12. service-reviews-ultimate.elfsight.com (reviews service)
13. Domain-level cookies set on elfsight.com

The /p/boot/ requests confirm the two-stage loader in action. Each widget ID is sent to core.service.elfsight.com, which responds with widget configuration and an assets array of JavaScript files to inject. Here are the actual scripts returned by the server during our capture:

// TikTok widget -> server responds with:
"assets": ["https://universe-static.elfsightcdn.com/app-releases/tiktok-feed/stable/v2.46.1/.../tiktokFeed.js"]

// Instagram widget -> server responds with:
"assets": ["https://static.elfsight.com/apps/instashow/stable/.../instashow.js"]

// Facebook widget -> server responds with:
"assets": ["https://static.elfsight.com/apps/facebook-feed/stable/.../facebookFeed.js"]

// YouTube widget -> server responds with:
"assets": ["https://static.elfsight.com/apps/yottie/stable/.../yottie.js"]

The app’s loadAssets function creates a <script> element for each URL and appends it to the page. The server decides what runs. This is the two-stage loader we documented in our static analysis now confirmed in live traffic.

The response also sets cookies including elfsight_viewed_recently, Cloudflare tracking cookies (_cfuvid, __cf_bm), and session identifiers. We counted 10+ cookies set by Elfsight infrastructure during a single session.

Google DoubleClick Ad Tracking

The YouTube embeds load Google’s ad tracking infrastructure:

• googleads.g.doubleclick.net (Google Ads)
• static.doubleclick.net (DoubleClick ad scripts)

DoubleClick is Google’s ad serving and tracking platform. Its presence means Google’s advertising infrastructure is running inside the official White House app, tracking user engagement with video content. This was not disclosed in the privacy manifest.

The Privacy Manifest vs. Reality

NSPrivacyCollectedDataTypes: []
NSPrivacyTracking: false

In a single browsing session, the app:

• Sent your device model, OS, IP address, timezone, language, session count, session duration, and a persistent unique identifier to OneSignal (a third-party analytics company)
• Contacted 13 Elfsight-controlled domains and received 10+ tracking cookies
• Loaded Google DoubleClick ad tracking infrastructure
• Made requests to Facebook CDN, Twitter/X CDN, YouTube, and Google APIs

The privacy label says “No Data Collected.”

Methodology

• Proxy: mitmproxy (mitmdump) on macOS
• Device: iPhone running iOS, connected to same WiFi network
• Certificate: mitmproxy CA installed and trusted in iOS Certificate Trust Settings
• Capture: Full HTTPS decryption of all app traffic
• Duration: Single browsing session across all five tabs (Home, News, Live, Social, Explore)
• Modifications: None. Traffic was observed, not altered.
• Personal data: All IP addresses, device identifiers, and OneSignal IDs have been redacted from this post.

No servers were probed. No traffic was modified. We watched what the app sends on its own.

Related Work

• Static analysis of the White House iOS app (our original post)
• Thereallo’s analysis of the Android version

About

Atomic Computer provides cybersecurity, infrastructure, and development services. If you need a security assessment of your mobile app, get in touch.